There is no specific statutory legislation in the British Virgin Islands dealing with the application of property laws to crypto or virtual assets.
The Commercial Court of the British Virgin Islands (the “Commercial Court”) handed down judgement in ChainSwap v Persons Unknown [2022], in granting a freezing injunction over the crypto assets, that the crypto assets were choses or things in action and as such property. The Commercial Court in so doing agreed with the UK High Court’s judgement in Fetch. AI Limited v Persons Unknown [2021] EWHC 2254 (Comm).
The Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court (the “Supreme Court”) stated in Philip Smith and Jason Kardachi (in their capacity as joint liquidators) v Torque Group Holdings Ltd that crypto assets should be treated as property specifically in the context of liquidation [26]. The Supreme Court gave an express endorsement of the UK Jurisdiction Taskforce’s Legal statement on crypto assets and smart contracts (the “UK Statement”) in coming to its view and cited with approval the UK High Court case of AA v Persons Unknown, Re Bitcoin [2019] EWHC 3556 (Comm) on the issue as to whether crypto assets are a form of property. In Re Bitcoin the UK High Court decided that even though crypto assets did not fall neatly into either of the categorisations of ‘chose in action’ nor ‘tangible assets,” they could still be regarded as property.
BVI law allows parties to agree which country’s law should govern certain aspects of their business relationships and transactions. If the parties to a smart contract want BVI law to apply as far as possible, they should provide for this in the contract.
The UK Statement provides that:
“When it comes to assessing which country’s laws should be used to determine their effect, the law considers the transacting party’s choice to be of little relevance. Instead, to answer questions such as how property is to be classified, whether a proprietary security or other interest exists, and how and when a transfer of property affects third parties, judges have traditionally applied the law of the country where the property is situated at a relevant time. That is largely for two reasons. First, at least when dealing with tangible property— things in possession—the country in which the asset is located is easily identified and third parties might reasonably suppose that the law of the country determines property issues. Secondly, that country has physical control over assets within its borders, and a court judgment which is in conflict with its laws will often be ineffective.
Intangible property cannot of course be seen or touched, so what is meant by its ‘location’ is not so obvious. Nevertheless, the same rule is usually applied, even though the reason to do so is not as convincing. The law allocates an artificial location to certain types of intangible property, which is often the place in which some sort of control over the property might be exercised. Many things in action are therefore considered to be situated in the country where they are properly recoverable by action or can be enforced. But the rules and how they apply are often difficult to state with any certainty.”
…and suggests that:
“the following factors might be particularly relevant in determining whether English and Welsh law governs the proprietary aspects of dealings in crypto assets (in no particular order): (a) Whether any relevant off-chain asset is located in England and Wales; (b) Whether there is any centralised control in England and Wales; (c) Whether a particular crypto asset is controlled by particular participant in England and Wales (because, for example, a private key is stored here); (d) Whether the law applicable to the relevant transfer (perhaps by reason of the parties’ choice) is English law.”